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ABSTRACT 
This reply to papers by Pearl and Shafer focuses on two issues underlying the 
debate on the validity of using Dempster-Shafer theory, namely the requirement 
of a process-independent semantics and the a priori need for multiple uncertainty 
calculi. Pearl shows deficiencies of Dempster-Shafer theory in dealing with several 
instances of commonsense reasoning in a process-independent manner. Although 
this argument iscorrect under the assumptions stated, it is weakened somewhat by 
introducing questions of whether aprocess-independent semantics i always neces- 
sary or desirable. 
Another issue underlying both papers, whether multiple uncertainty representa- 
tions are necessary, is also discussed. Shafer claims that multiple uncertainty 
representations are necessary. He presents a goal of developing all uncertainty 
representations in parallel and defining domains in which each representation is
best suited. In contrast, Pearl implicitly claims that probability theory alone is 
necessary, unless the use of another representation (such as Dempster-Shafer 
theory) is shown to be clearly advantageous. These two perspectives lead 
to different approaches to defining the form of uncertainty best modeled by 
Dempster-Shafer theory or any other uncertainty calculus. 
KEYWORDS: Dempster-Shafer theory, probability theory, uncertainty 
representations 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Both papers by Pearl [1] and Shafer [2] attempt to more carefully delineate 
the domain of applicability of Dempster-Shafer theory (DST). Among other 
things, Shafer discusses the semantics of several interpretations of DST, 
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thereby providing insight into the appropriate applications of DST. Pearl shows 
that applying DST to represent tasks involving (1) incomplete knowledge, (2) 
belief updating, and (3) evidence pooling, tasks for which DST has been 
claimed appropriate, in fact either produces counterintuitive r sults or is 
otherwise inadequate. 
It is important to delineate the domain of applicability of all uncertainty 
calculi. Probability theory is arguably the best understood uncertainty calculus, 
and DST needs further analysis. Clearly, analyses of DST as provided by 
Shafer and Pearl are needed. However, there seem to be underlying (and 
conflicting) motivations to the ways in which DST has been analyzed by Shafer 
and Pearl. 
First, the two authors differ on whether a process-independent semantics i
fundamental to reasoning tasks. This assumption makes a big difference to 
whether a calculus like DST is widely applicable. Second, they differ on the 
extent o which multiple uncertainty calculi are necessary and/or desirable. 
Shafer starts from the point of view that reasoning under uncertainty requires 
multiple calculi, each calculus being used for given tasks to which it is best 
suited. DST, it is claimed, is a calculus that is most appropriate for a set of 
tasks that are outlined in that paper [2]. In contrast, Pearl, a staunch defender 
of probability theory [3, 4] (and see the related arguments of Cheeseman [5, 
6]), starts from the point of view that a single uncertainty calculus, probability 
theory, is sufficient, unless the superiority of some alternative calculus (over 
probability theory) can be proved precisely. From this perspective, Pearl aims 
to show that DST is inferior to probability theory for tasks for which DST has 
been claimed suitable, and hence cannot supplant probability theory for these 
tasks. 
In this reply, issues relating to process-independent semantics and uncer- 
tainty calculi are discussed in Section 2. Questions concerning the need for 
multiple uncertainty calculi, and how DST fits into such a scheme of 
single/multiple calculi, are discussed in Section 3. A few conclusions are then 
presented. 
2. SEMANTICAL ISSUES 
In this section, the issue of whether a process-independent semantics i the 
best one for uncertain reasoning is discussed. A process-independent semantics 
is one in which the semantics of propositions is independent of how the 
propositions are derived. Such a semantics provides a powerful normative 
theory of belief ascription, among other things. 
This argument focuses on whether such a semantics i  appropriate for all 
reasoning tasks. One interpretation f DST is in terms of a process-dependent 
assignment of conditional probability to the provability of a proposition, given 
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that the evidence for the proposition is noncontradictory. Enforcing a process- 
independent semantics on DST renders it incorrect in certain circumstances 
(as shown by Pearl [1]), whereas the process independence of probability 
theory still produces correct results. However, if indeed the means of obtain- 
ing results is important, then DST will be correct for some of the cases for 
which Pearl shows it is incorrect. 
To shed some light on these questions, possible formalizations of common- 
sense reasoning are introduced. 
2.1. Possible Notions of Commonsense Reasoning 
This section introduces questions of whether a process-independent seman- 
tics is always necessary or desirable. To determine what form of semantics i  
necessary, one needs to define commonsense r asoning (CSR). Pearl never 
precisely defines CSR; he is not to be faulted for this, as very few people who 
do research in CSR do either. CSR has to do with rather vague tasks like 
reasoning with exceptions, such as "birds fly," knowing that there exist 
flightless birds. 
Questions to be posed include "What is an exception?", or "How are 
default rules deduced?" It is not clear whether these questions can be evaluated 
over time, for example, with trial and error, so that a relative frequency 
semantics (which is process-independent) can be assigned, or whether the 
process of determining the default assignment is important. 
There are a multitude of possible interpretations of what CSR might be 
about. This review is meant o be illustrative, and not comprehensive. 
RELATIVE FREQUENCY INTERPRETATION A relative frequency interpreta- 
tion of a default rule is based on notions of frequency of events. It might be 
true that, over the process of evolution, certain "default rules" may have been 
established by trial and error and/or observation over large samples (i.e., 
many individuals over a large time span). For example, consider the situation 
proposed by Boden [7], who examines how a kingfisher might catch fish if it 
does not explicitly know Shell's law of light's refraction in water. She hints at 
Snell's rule being hardwired owing to the evolutionary experience of the 
kingfisher; that is, out of the population of kingfishers who dive in multiple 
fashions, the kingfishers that just happened to dive using Shell's law ate well 
and prospered, and all other kingfishers ate less well because they caught fewer 
fish owing to the refractive properties of water. Over time the average 
kingfishers were replaced by the healthier birds obeying Snell's law. 
Aleliunas [8] presents a similar evolutionary argument. He argues that 
knowledge about he world is statistical knowledge (presumably compiled over 
the process of evolution). The strong claim that intelligence necessitates the use 
of these statistics is made using a Dutch book argument. 
392 Gregory M. Provan 
In a sense, then, a default rule can be seen to have been derived from a 
sample set, and relative frequency statistics can be used to analyze the default. 
This is one of many possible interpretations of defaults. For domains in which 
this interpretation is appropriate, a frequentist approach is best, and DST is 
relatively less appropriate. 
However, it is unclear whether this frequentist interpretation f default rules 
could be true in all cases. In many situations, it appears that default rules are 
established and applied with relatively little experience. For example, biases 
are often established over a very small sample set but are applied to a large 
population. Buying a green apple that makes one sick may lead to a bias 
against non-red apples, even though Granny Smith and Golden Delicious 
apples are perfectly edible. In the apple example, modeling the default 
"Non-red apples are inedible" relies entirely on how the default was created, 
and not on statistical arguments about the proportion of green apples that are 
inedible. 
ARGUMENT SYSTEMS A second possible interpretation of CSR is given by 
argument systems (Loui [9], Poole [10])--for each proposition believed true, 
an argument is constructed concerning why it should be believed. In this case 
the structure of the argument (e.g., whether it is the shortest argument) is of 
primary importance. 
Shafer [2] suggests that procedural methods hould be used. This entails that 
the reliance on declarative semantics may be throwing us off the track of 
modeling CSR and hence is undesirable: "process-independent semantics is 
not a reasonable goal for AI" as "judgments under uncertainty.., depend on 
the process by which they were made as well as on the objective nature of the 
evidence." Shafer also cites Winograd [11] in claiming that AI must use 
statements hat have no meaning " in any semantic system that fails to deal 
explicitly with the reasoning process." If this argument were adopted, the 
notion of provability underlying DST (Pearl [4], Provan [12]) would be more 
appropriate than the declarative semantics of probability theory. But this in 
turn necessitates a closer examination of what is meant by CSR. 
One approach to studying CSR has been the analysis of belief ascription and 
revision. In particular, there has been a great deal of research on belief 
revision (e.g., Alchourron et al. [13], Shoham [14], Martins and Shapiro [15]) 
and on an implementation f belief revision, truth maintenance systems (TMSs) 
(Doyle [16], de Kleer [17], Martins and Shapiro [15]). A TMS records the 
arguments for the belief of propositions (in terms of assumptions or rules 
underlying the proposition). It is interesting to note that the semantical 
relationship between TMSs and DST has been used as a means of implement- 
ing DST (Laskey and Lehner [18], Provan [19]). 
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY A subjective interpretation of probability can be 
assigned a semantics according to betting behavior, given the subjective 
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assignment of probabilities. Note that this semantics is process-independent. 
This is the probabilistic interpretation favored within AI and is the one 
championed by Pearl. One point not raised in Pearl's critique of the difficulties 
in establishing a coherent model for defaults using DST is that all models, 
including the subjective probability model [e.g., e-semantics (Pearl [4])], have 
had difficulty. 
Clearly, assigning a coherent semantics to defaults is a difficult task, and 
research could probably be furthered by examining the nature of what is to be 
modeled in a default and how a default is best used in the real world (and not 
just the Tweety/Opus flight domains). Without precisely defining default rules 
one cannot condemn an uncertainty calculus for not modeling a poorly defined 
paradigm. 
2.2. Normative/Subjective Questions 
Another question with CSR (and uncertainty calculi for CSR) is whether the 
goal is to simulate human CSR or to enable computers to reason in a normative 
manner (possibly given small samples of data). There are many reasons to use 
a purely normative reasoning system. However, the computational expense 
typically required by such systems entails the use of approximation techniques 
and/or heuristics. The subjective reasoning of humans may be a rich source 
for such techniques. For example, medical expert systems use rules and 
probabilities derived from experts' experience. Such probabilities are now 
combined in a normative manner [as opposed to the heuristic methods of 
earlier systems like MYCIN (Buchanan and Shortliffe [20])]. However, the 
subjective origins (and possible subsequent use for diagnosis and treatment) of 
the probabilities cannot be forgotten. 
This is not necessarily an argument for subjectivism, but a reflection on the 
fact that purely normative methods may be infeasible in many circumstances. 
2.3. Questions of Utility 
What is the CSR conclusion to be used for? All CSR judgments are 
utility-based. For example, if it is a life-and-death decision, then it is important 
that the decision be a good one. But if it has trivial consequences, for example, 
I can take either the 2:14 bus or 2:30 train to New York, and both will get me 
there around 3:30, then a poor decision will have little consequence. 
The need for utility functions argues strongly in favor of probability theory, 
with its well-understood decision theory. DST has no notion of utility compa- 
l This is similar to a conclusion reached in an analysis of the normative use of logic for 
reasoning (McDermott [21]), namely that he normative approach toreasoning has been partially 
successful and further research inboth normative and subjective approaches is necessary. 
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rable to that of probability theory, although arguments have been made about 
ascribing such notions (Smets [22], Jaffray [23]). Further research is clearly 
necessary. 
3. SINGLE-CALCULUS VS. PLURALIST VIEWPOINT 
One of the fundamental issues underlying the two papers of Pearl [1] and 
Shafer [2] is whether there is a single uncertainty calculus appropriate for all 
forms of reasoning. It is desirable to have a single calculus as the foundation 
for reasoning from many perspectives; these issues are not discussed here. The 
question at issue here is whether that is possible. 
Shafer adopts a pluralistic viewpoint, namely that probability theory, 
Dempster-Shafer theory, Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson methods, fuzzy set 
theory, etc., can all play vital roles in reasoning under uncertainty. He argues 
that "the mere fact that there is uncertainty in a problem does not mean that 
the theory of probability is useful in the problem." Shafer makes the guarded 
statement [2, Sec. 2] that modeling the uncertainty for a given problem must be 
done on a case-by-case basis and cannot be done simply by determining the 
calculus (probabilistic or otherwise) best suited to that general class of prob- 
lem. Nonetheless, establishing the advantages and disadvantages of using 
specific calculi to model the uncertainty present in given classes of tasks must 
help in narrowing the types of calculi most suitable for a particular problem. 
Shafer is attempting to more precisely define the role Dempster-Shafer 
theory can play in uncertain reasoning, given his world view of many 
uncertainty calculi playing various roles according to which representation is 
best for each role. In fact, implicit in Shafer's pluralistic view is the notion that 
no uncertainty calculus is optimal or adequate for all uncertainty reasoning 
tasks. 
In contrast, Pearl argues from the viewpoint hat probability theory is the 
accepted calculus for reasoning under uncertainty. Hence, for a new calculus 
X to be accepted, it must be shown either that probability theory is unable to 
model a certain form of uncertainty (while X can) or that X can model a form 
of uncertainty better than probability theory [e.g., X demonstrates greater 
efficiency, imposes fewer unwarranted requirements ( uch as variable indepen- 
dence), etc.] Historically, many alternative calculi have been proposed and 
implemented in systems without clear demonstration f their advantages over 
probability theory. 2 Hence, Pearl is forcing the proponents of alternative 
2 Both MYCIN certainty factors (Buchanan and Shortliffe [20]) and DST have been guilty of 
being used inappropriately. 
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calculi (like DST) to precisely define the domains for which the calculi are best 
suited and not merely assume that it is more advantageous to use a calculus 
with certain properties. 
3.1. Origins of Pluralistic Viewpoint 
Many different uncertainty calculi have been developed to circumvent the 
perceived problems of probability theory. These perceived inadequacies in- 
clude the following. 
• Pr iors  One well-known problem is the large number of priors required. 
In cases where there are many unknown or missing priors, probability 
theory cannot be used effectively; it is for such problems that DST is 
claimed to be useful. 
• Psycho log ica l  val idity The justification that probability theory is used 
by people in commonsense r asoning (CSR) is not validated by psycho- 
logical investigation. Tversky and Kahneman [24] have shown that most 
people (even trained mathematicians) have difficulty using probability 
theory correctly. Several other studies (Tversky and Kahneman [25, 26], 
Birnbaum [27]) have shown that reasoning is done using some calculus 
other than probability theory. In examining the evidence, Smithson [28] 
concludes: 
Even after one accounts for the lack of specification i  many of the 
problems and tasks, possible confounding or artifactual factors, and the 
potential for nonshared understanding between subject and experi- 
menter, there is still sufficient residuum of evidence to suggest strongly 
that Bayesian (or any other kind of) probability does not fit what many 
people do when making judgments and decisions under uncertainty. 
The dominant rend in the literature has been to account for the 
subjects' judgements by fairly simple "heuristics." 
3.2. Discussion 
A question that arises is whether probability theory (or any other knowledge 
representation calculus) can or should be a basis for CSR. What is desired is a 
holy grail, the underlying cognitive calculus by which all forms of reasoning 
are dictated. Both logic (McCarthy and Hayes [29], Moore [30]) and probabil- 
ity theory (Cheeseman [5, 6]) have been proposed as the calculus for all 
reasoning. A detailed iscussion of the arguments for and against he validity 
of such claims is not presented here. The main argument made here is that a 
single-calculus point of view can have an adverse affect upon scientific 
research. In particular, some reasons for studying multiple uncertainty calculi 
in parallel, rather than a single calculus, are presented. 
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First, the issue of whether probability can model all forms of uncertainty and 
ignorance is as yet unresolved. For example, it is claimed that the uncertainty 
(e.g., vagueness) modeled by fuzzy set theory cannot be modeled by probabil- 
ity theory (Zadeh [31, 32]); moreover, even within fuzzy set theory Klir [33] 
has proposed a separation of "vagueness" from "ambiguity." These issues 
are not discussed here for lack of space; Smithson [28] presents a detailed 
analysis of the many arguments. Smithson argues that these issues are unre- 
solved, but it appears that multiple uncertainty calculi are indeed necessary, 
owing to the inability of any single calculus to model all types of uncertainty. 
Strict adherence to a single-calculus viewpoint means that some forms of 
uncertainty may not be modelable within that calculus. 
A second issue is whether the same uncertainty calculus can be used for all 
domains, let alone for many types of uncertainty that can arise in any one 
domain. It may be the case that different uncertainties are required for different 
domains, such as machine vision, natural language, problem solving, and game 
playing. 
Acceptance of a pluralism of uncertainty representations changes the way 
in which DST (or any other uncertainty calculus) is studied. A rigid single- 
calculus approach may attempt o undermine the validity of DST through 
(possibly unfair) comparisons within a setting inappropriate o its application. 
For example, consider two incorrect interpretations of DST in terms of 
probability theory: 
• The interpretation of DST belief and plausibility measures as probability 
bounds, which is inconsistent with Dempster's combination rule (Zadeh 
[34]); or 
• The process-independent interpretation of DST mass functions and belief 
measures, which can lead to counterintuitive r sults (Pearl [1]). 
In contrast, the pluralist approach attempts to determine how best DST can be 
used, in settings where its semantics are valid. It may turn out that DST (and 
many recently devised uncertainty calculi) are inferior to more established 
calculi (e.g., probability theory) for a variety of reasons, such as computa- 
tional efficiency or lack of a domain that the calculus models in a clearly 
superior manner. If that occurs, such calculi will be abandoned. But these new 
calculi must be judged fairly and evaluated using conditions in which they 
would actually be appropriate. However, if one adopts a pluralist approach, 
parallel exploration of multiple uncertainty calculi must be conducted using the 
same precise mathematical criteria with which probability theory has been 
analyzed. It is clear that the sloppy analyses that have been applied to DST, 
certainty factors, and other alternative calculi are inadequate and indeed 
counterproductive. What is needed is a precise analysis based on criteria 
relevant to the semantics of each calculus. Note that this proposal does not rule 
out the extension of any single calculus to model forms of uncertainty 
previously not modeled by that calculus; for example, consider the extension of 
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probability theory to include the exploration of second-order probabilities 
(Pearl [35], Kyburg [36]). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
If Pearl's assumptions [1] are correct, we agree with his demonstration of
the deficiencies of DST in dealing with several instances of CSR in a 
process-independent manner. However, his argument is weakened somewhat 
by questioning whether a process-independent semantics i always necessary or 
desirable. 
Another issue underlying both papers, the utility of studying multiple 
uncertainty representations i  parallel, is also discussed. Shafer [2] claims that 
multiple uncertainty representations are necessary. Therefore, the goal is to 
develop all uncertainty representations i  parallel and define domains in which 
each representation is best suited. We argue that the goal of justifying 
probability theory, or any other uncertainty calculus, as the only uncertainty 
calculus is a counterproductive research agenda, as it may lead to an inability 
to model all forms of uncertainty. However, tacit acceptance and study of new 
uncertainty calculi without precise analysis is also counterproductive. Since 
probability theory is the best developed calculus to date, the burden is thus 
placed on the proponents of DST and other newer uncertainty calculi to 
precisely define the semantics, computational properties, and domains of 
applicability of these theories, thereby showing the superiority of such calculi 
with respect o probability theory. 
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